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Article 1

President's Page

To Treat Or Not To Treat
At our recent annual meeting, Richard McCormick, S.J. made some
observations relative to the need for therapy in newborn defective
children which were first voiced in his article on the same subject in
the Journal of The American Medical Association, July 8, 1974. It is
Father McCormick's opinion that" ... life is not a value to be preserved in and for itself ... it is a value to be preserved precisely as a
condition for other values. Since these other values cluster around and
are rooted in human relationships, it seems to follow that life is a
value to be preserved precisely only insofar as it contains some potentiality for human relationships. When in human judgment this potentiality is totally absent or would be utterly submerged and undeveloped
in the mere struggle to survive, that life has achieved its potential."
The implication being that such an individual because of the quality
of his life should not receive life preserving medical therapy. The basis
for the judgment whether or not to institute therapy would be the
projected nature of this individual's life. In other words, an ethical
judgment is called for regarding the existence of a human being based
on the value of that individual's life to himself and whether this can be
achieved or fulfilled by his continued existence.
Father McCormick has done a distinct service to all who are charged
with the care of these seriously iII patients by his careful analysis of
the problem before us, particularly by his indication that the traditional guidelines of ordinary-extraordinary means have lost much of
their usefulness in modern clinical practice because of the necessity
of their application on a situational basis. We must remember, however, that the quality of life ethic applied as a determinant as to
whether or not a human being should be treated or sustained exposes
the individual and society to a perilous path. One need only remember
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the experience of German medicine chronicled by Frederic Wertham
in "A Sign for Cain" to recall that the first application of Binding
and Hoche's thesis of "The Release of the Destruction of Life Devoid
of Value" was in defective pediatric patients, many of whom I am sure
were in the same category as that which prompts this discussion .
It would seem to me that the physician facin g the therapeutic
quandary of the seriously defective newborn must consider the merits
of three methods of ethical analysis available.
a) Ordinary·extraordinary means, which h as serious d e fects in prac ti ca l a p·
plication because of its situational base.
b ) A guideline centered on "th e pote nti a l for human relationships associated
with the infant's condition," suggested by Father McCormick a nd which
I would t e rm a con sidera tion based on a n assessment of the individu a l's
prospective qu ality of life. The application of this principle in clinical
practice ~ould require a deg ree of onmiscience quite beyond the limits of
a ny known huma n agen cy , including th e fallible physician . For exa mpl e ,
cerebra l palsy victims whose a bility to participate in the "goods" of life
may not be disce rnibl e for m a n y yea rs a fte r the ir bi rth. Here we see a
common phenomenon in which observe rs of the m edi cal discipline gra nt
to the ph ysicia n di scrimin ato ry powers which a re beyond hi s abilities.
c) A m ethod restricted to considerations of therapeutic benefit for the pa·
tie nt. How mu ch better is the approach of the phys icia n when fa ced with
t he cl ini ca l probl em as to the wisdom of institutin g or continuing medi ca l
or surgical the ra py fo r a defective n ewborn child, or se riou sly damaged
adult fo r that matte r, who mak es hi s d ec is ion not on the basis of wh e the r
or not his patient ca n fulfill hi s pote ntia l for huma n relation ship, but
rather on the bas is that eve ry huma n life has intrin s ic worth, potentia l
or fulfill ed, and th at th e decision for therapy should be based solely on
wheth e r this form of m edical the ra py ca n be expected to restore t he ill or
d e fect ive child to that sta te of h ea lth for which the the rapy was planned.
Two examples of this are the anencephalic child with a tracheo-esophageal
fi stul a which I would not treat and the mongoloid child with the tracheoesophagea l fi stul a which I h ave treated. In the first insta nce cor rection
of t h e T-E fistula would 110t resto re the p a tient to a sta te of health becau se
the ve ry n a ture of the a n en ce pha ly would resul t in the child 's dea th from
other ca uses within a short period of time even with surgi ca l inte rvention.
In the second insta nce t.he intervent.ion would restore the d efective child
to a s tate of h ealth com patible with the pursuit of a life whose quality
was o rda ined by our C reator. The sam e principl e of institutin g o r disco ntinuin g therapy on the basis of its efficacy in achieving the goa ls for
which it is pla nn ed is applicable to decisions rega rding therapy for
severely damaged ca rdi ac or neuro- surgical pa tients whe n we di scontinu e
res pirato rs after it h as become ev ide nt that their furth e r u se cannot
possibly restore the patient to h ealth eve n though the patient m ay h a ve
va ry ing a bilities to fulfill hi s potentia l for human relationships.

The physician should never be placed or place himself in the position
of determining whether his patient should live or die on the basis of his
judgment concerning the quality of the patient's life but should properly make his decision on whether or not his therapy will be of benefit to his patient. Physicians are the agents of the patient, not {)f the
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relatives or society. Neither does the physician have the attributes or
perquisites of the Creator to determine whether or not this particular
human being should exist. The fundamental questions (What are the
minimal elements of human personhood? What are the minimal measures necessary for the sustenance of human life?) go unanswered. Certainly the resolution of these questions is mandatory before any broad
guidelines can be applicable in clinical practice.
Edward G. Kilroy, M.D.

Editorial
Definition of Death
It has been proposed that the moment of human death be defined
as the moment of irreversible cessation of both respiratory and cardiac
function , and in the event that these functions are being maintained
artificially, the moment of irreversible cessation of cerebral function
be defined as the moment of death .
It is my contention that such a definition of death is too narrowly
drawn and too rigid in its requirements that the failure of a particular
organ system must be present to establish the reality ' of clinical or
legal death. This definition does not conform to the biological reality
that death of an organism occurs when that organism's biological systems undergo an irreversible loss of the ability to maintain vital functions. A pacemaker and/ or circulatory assist devices may preserve
cardiac functions, and artificial ventilators respiratory function indefinitely with normal cerebral function - a form of "living death."
Conversely, total cessation of brain function may occur and as long
as artificial respiration is maintained spontaneous cardiac function
can occur and be maintained. If we were to ahere to this definition
of death, the practicing physician would be obligated to maintain all
efforts to maintain "life" as the New Jersey's Quinlan case seems
to be saying. It is my feeling that such a definition of death would
expose the physician to unwarranted malpractice liability if he did
not continue all medical therapy until cessation of cerebral function
was established and would require extensive clinical and laboratory
documentation of cessation of cerebral function in every case, which is
clearly not indicated in the majority of clinical situations. Another
failing of this type of definition is the inability of such a legal statement to apply to changing events in medical knowledge regarding
what bodily functions are truly necessary to maintain life. What is
cerebral death this year may not be cerebral death next year, etc.
The patient and physician would be much better served by a much
broader definition of death which would leave to the attending physician the employment of all his clinical experience and the most -ad-
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